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The success of the "KONY 2012" video shows the vast reserves of idealism and concern out there. Here is how to turn 
that concern into useful action. 
 
From the Internet to a street corner in Austin, the KONY 2012 campaign has gone viral in an unprecedented way. 
(Robert Raines / flickr) 
Earlier this month, more than 30 civilians were killed during armed attacks in South Kivu, in eastern Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. Those killings were committed not by the Lord's Resistance Army but by one of the many 
Congolese militias operating in the area. In recent months, those groups have been responsible for a marked increase 
in violence, but in most cases, such attacks go unnoticed by international media. So it was in this case: as usual, it is 
only thanks to local sources that we know about such events at all. 
The lack of attention is ironic at the moment because of the sudden popularity of the KONY 2012 video campaign. 
Invisible Children, a nonprofit, has focused the world on Joseph Kony, who heads the Lord's Resistance Army, a rebel 
group established in the mid-1980s to fight the government of Uganda that has gained a reputation for its extreme 
acts, including the mutilation of victims and the forced enlistment of children. Six years ago, the Lord's Resistance 
Army left Uganda during a peace process; it is now operating in the Central African Republic, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, and South Sudan.  
The notion that Kony might be handed over to the ICC and publicly prosecuted in The Hague seems unlikely.  
With more than 70 million views so far, Invisible Children's documentary on YouTube, coupled with a stupendously 
successful viral media campaign, has achieved its aim of reaching a mass audience. In addition to the attention it has 
attracted on social networks in the United States and Europe, it has garnered mainstream media attention: nearly every 
major Western news outlet ran some kind of story last week on Kony or on Invisible Children's campaign.  
However, people living in LRA-affected regions have been quick to criticize KONY 2012 as simplistic and naïve. The 
flash movement's message, so the feeling goes, neglects local realities of past and present. Ugandan bloggers, 
opposition politicians, and victims have spoken out. For example, the leader of the Ugandan Democratic Party, 
Norbert Mao (who appears in the KONY 2012 video), has pointed to the lack of attention given to atrocities 
committed by the Ugandan army, and the blogger Rosebell Kagumire has taken issue with the idea that the good guys 
-- "the mighty West" -- must save Africa from one bad guy. Meanwhile, Victor Ochen, who grew up in a northern 
Ugandan displacement camp and now runs the African Youth Initiative Network, has argued that the solution that 
Invisible Children offers will not improve victims' lives. In the areas where the LRA operates today, residents' main 
concerns involve the general lack of security -- including protection from Ugandan or Congolese army operations. In 
short, KONY 2012 misses the point. 
But watching the film, it is clear that the campaign was not aimed primarily at reversing conflict dynamics in Central 
Africa. KONY 2012 is a quintessentially American fable printed on an African canvas, one that has sparked a 
vigorous debate over how far accuracy can be stretched for a good cause, how to harness the power of social media, 
and what the role of the United States in ending conflicts far away from home should be. Perhaps not surprisingly, the 
demand it makes -- to somehow apprehend Kony by military means, with U.S. help as the only solution -- is illogical 
and uninformed.  
Sadly, for many concerned viewers in the United States and other rich countries, KONY 2012 may turn out to be a 
brief diversion, just a bit of Internet chatter. As things stand, this sudden fountain of attention and goodwill is unlikely 
to make the situation better in Central Africa. 
The film that started it all was Invisible Children: Rough Cut (2004), a moving portrayal of the plight of a few 
selected English-speaking "night commuters" -- children who took refuge in Gulu, in northern Uganda, to escape 
abduction by the LRA in the country's more rural areas. Viewers of Invisible Children: Rough Cut learned that 
sleeping on the streets of Gulu was safer than staying outside the town, but they were left in the dark about atrocities 
committed by the Ugandan army against the civilians it purported to be protecting, and the long-term marginalization 
of the region by the Ugandan government. The film also ignored the hundreds of thousands of children and adults who 
remained in government displacement camps, stationed too far away to walk to the big towns. Living conditions in 
those camps were atrocious, far worse than in the environs of Gulu. Invisible Children: Rough Cut gave such a narrow 
portrayal that it inadvertently lent support to oppressive government anti-insurgency policies and ended up focusing 
attention on what was probably the safest place in the war-affected region. 
Likewise, KONY 2012 packs a superbly produced emotional punch through deployment of partial fact. Some parts of 
the original film live on and are passed off as representing aspects of the contemporary situation. Jacob Acaye, one of 
the "night commuters," returns as an adult, to demonstrate that Invisible Children has made a difference in his life. 
Filmmaker Jason Russell also included shots of himself with his young son having fun with computer graphics of 
blowing people up -- coupled with uplifting suggestions that this video is a way for everyone in the world to connect.  
The film reports that Kony has captured more than 30,000 children and implies that these children can return home, as 
Jacob Acaye did, if Kony is captured. Among the many estimates, that figure of 30,000 is modest, but what is 
important is that nobody actually knows exact figures. The 30,000 number likely comes from a widely cited UNICEF 
survey of abductions between 1997 and 2001. During that time, 28,903 people had been taken by the LRA -- some for 
short amounts of time, such as one day. The most intense period of abductions occurred soon after peace talks failed 
in 1996. UNICEF established that less than a third of those abducted were below the age of 18; about 45 percent were 
between 18 and 45. But the fact is that these data are more than a decade old. Today, it is unlikely that the LRA 
consists of more than a few hundred people.  
For those involved in the painstaking work of peacebuilding over the years, other aspects of the KONY 2012 video 
are infuriating. The film neglects the peace talks that took place in Juba between 2006 and 2008, a factor that 
contributed to the withdrawal of the LRA from northern Uganda, and it does not even mention the subsequent U.S.-
supported and botched military strike against the LRA that put an end to those negotiations in December 2008 and 
triggered the return to war. Without that context, there is no way for viewers to understand the way LRA violence 
spread across the borders of South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic, the 
result of which today is widespread insecurity.  
In KONY 2012, the Ugandan and Congolese armies get a free pass. Recent evidence points to rape, looting, and 
illegal resource exploitation by soldiers in the locations where they have been sent to chase down Kony. Truth be told, 
the LRA has actually become a relatively minor player in a generally violent environment -- a fact well known to 
researchers and aid workers but neglected in the film.  
Such nuance has been set aside through the way in which Invisible Children has harnessed social media. KONY 2012 
bills itself as an experiment at "making Joseph Kony a household name, not to celebrate him, but to bring his crimes 
to the light" and to "go after policy-makers." These are U.S. policymakers, who, the video explains, have the power to 
back U.S. military support. The film quotes Louis Moreno Ocampo, the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), and the implication is that the U.S. military would arrest Kony so he can face charges in The Hague.  
It's an interesting proposition, because the United States is not a member of the ICC, and so far, the official 
justification for Washington's involvement in Uganda was that it was in the interest of U.S. national security, rather 
than in the interest of international justice. Recently, the Obama administration has signaled an end to the hostile 
relationship between the ICC and Washington, but whether this will go as far as using U.S. military to execute ICC 
warrants remains to be seen.  
Hidden behind these confusing messages is another issue. If the film were actually about change, it might have 
addressed its own paradox: that trying yet again to end a military conflict with more of the same sort of military 
engagement will probably cost too many civilian lives. Alas, there is no real solution offered here, only publicity. And 
raising consciousness would be great, if coupled with long-term informed attention rather than a mainly U.S.-based 
buzz.   
But let's end on a more positive note. The notion that Kony might be handed over to the ICC and publicly prosecuted 
in The Hague seems unlikely. But who knows -- the publicity may make Kony consider handing himself in. He has 
talked about doing this in the past in exchange for being allowed to give testimony about crimes committed by the 
Ugandan army in this conflict. If this happens, it could lead to a sustained and serious international gaze at the failures 
of governance in Central Africa in which so many are complicit -- not just local governments and armed factions like 
the LRA but also international actors. If KONY 2012 can really be about ending impunity, and if it can distance itself 
from just scapegoating Kony (bad as he is), then the awesome levels of mass mobilization already attained may not be 
wasted after all. 
 
